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ABSTRACT:  Violence is one of the most pervasive problems in the world today.  Despite all 
efforts to apply the powers of reason in order to contain, if not completely eliminate violence, 
violence proves to be capable of escaping capture and re-emerging in new and unexpected 
forms.  Reason and rationality appear to be powerless against violence.  The paper explores 
some philosophical issues that shed new light on the persistence of violence in the modern 
world.  It argues that the failure of modernity to recognize and come to grips with the process 
of construction that constitutes the basis of our relationship with reality plays a critical role in 
the continued survival of violence. 




For over two centuries now the West has exercised an unprecedented hegemony in the 
modern world.  Its powerful effects are ubiquitous.  There is hardly any aspect in the 
life of the contemporary global community that the pervasive influence of the West has 
not affected:  from politics to economics, intellectual ideas, science, technology, the 
arts, and many others—all bear an unmistakable mark of the impact of Western 
supremacy.  The very notions of modernization and modernity that are integral to the 
contemporary world are hallmarks of Western culture. 
The Enlightenment project has been and remains at the heart of the 
unprecedented role of the West.  This project is ultimately not about a rigid set of 
doctrines or policies.  More than anything else, it is about a promise and a 
commitment to human reason.  In the minds of those who have framed and shaped 
this project, the rule of reason will pave the humanity’s path toward liberation.  They 
share one profound conviction:  that the rule of reason will help resolve all problems 
faced by the humanity and will bring democracy, justice, equality, economic 
prosperity, and peace to our troubled world. The world renewed by the salutary rule 
of reason will know no violence, no fanaticism, no tyranny, and no war.  There will be 
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no oppressors and oppressed, no victims and victimizers.   Under the guidance of 
reason we should be able to exercise rational and compassionate control over nature 
and its resources for the benefit of humanity and the world. 
Such is the promise that the West has extended to the rest of the world.  There 
have been moments in history when the fulfillment of this promise seemed close at 
hand.  The most recent moment occurred towards the end of the twentieth century 
with the collapse of communism and the end of the Cold War when many believed 
that we were on the threshold of an era of peace, prosperity, and the dominance of 
liberal democracy throughout the world.  Some even hazarded to proclaim that 
history had finally reached its end.1   Yet this moment did not last very long.   
Subsequent developments have proven such predictions to be an illusion, a dream 
of wishful thinkers that had nothing to do with the real world.  The attack on the 
World Trade Center on September 11, 2001, was a rude awakening from the self-
congratulatory complacency into which the West lulled itself.  It has revealed how 
deeply divided the world is and what powerful destructive and violent forces are at 
work.  Ever since the events of 9/11 no one has had any doubts that we continue to 
live in a dangerous, uncertain, and utterly unpredictable world, and that the 
fulfillment of the Enlightenment promise remains as distant as it has ever been.  In 
what we hear today from politicians and pundits, religious leaders and public figures, 
and even common citizens one can sense the same unsettling and troubling questions:  
Will the world survive?  Will our children see the future?  Will the promise made 
several centuries ago ever be fulfilled?  Will reason, rather than power and violence, 
prevail in our world? 
Since the dawn of the modern era, Western culture has viewed reason as a 
dynamic property of the human mind that is capable of organizing reality and 
developing it in ways that are beneficial to the human race and the world in general.  
Much of the project of modernity is about the affirmation, validation, and realization 
of what it sees as the infinite potential of human reason.  The elimination of violence is 
one of the most important goals that the rule of reason is supposed to achieve.  Many 
have believed, and continue to believe, that rational human agents guided by reason 
should be able to find ways of resolving conflicts without resorting to violent, 
destructive, and brutal forms of behavior.  They cherish the hope that wars can 
become obsolete and violence will have no place in human interactions. 
No one sees the project of modernity as a one-time deal with a clearly identifiable 
set of goals.   Rather, most view it as an on-going process with constantly expanding 
horizons.  However, this view does not mean that as the project evolves, its goals and 
1 Francis Fukuyama, The End of History and the Last Man (New York:  The Free Press, 1992). 
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promises will constantly receded into a distant future.  On the contrary, the project of 
modernity is about setting rational goals and achieving them.  In contrast with 
otherworldly promises of religion, much of the appeal of the project of modernity rests 
on its practicality, realism, and the expectation of success.  In fact, the very spirit of 
rationality and empirical proof --characteristic for the project of modernity -- implies 
that those who embrace this project measure its success by the attainment of its goals. 
No one sees the project of modernity as a one-time deal with a clearly identifiable 
set of goals.   Rather, most view it as an on-going process with constantly expanding 
horizons.  However, this view does not mean that as the project evolves, its goals and 
promises will constantly receded into a distant future.  On the contrary, the project of 
modernity is about setting rational goals and achieving them.  In contrast with 
otherworldly promises of religion, much of the appeal of the project of modernity rests 
on its practicality, realism, and the expectation of success.  In fact, the very spirit of 
rationality and empirical proof --characteristic for the project of modernity -- implies 
that those who embrace this project measure its success by the attainment of its goals. 
It has become commonplace to critique the project of modernity.  Numerous 
detractors have disparaged Enlightenment civilization for its insensitivity to the plight 
of the poor and underprivileged, its unrestrained search for gratification, for the 
ravages of merciless exploitation of people and nature, for its acceptance of the 
oppression of women and ethnic minorities, for its racial inequality, its imperialist 
expansionism and indignity of colonial domination, its disregard of human rights, and 
for religious intolerance.  Many have expressed doubts about its overall direction and 
prospects for success.   The skepticism of post-modernism regarding the capacity of 
reason to understand reality has gained substantial support in intellectual circles.  Even 
devoted advocates of modernity have expressed doubts about a possibility of its 
success.  In his contribution “Modernity:  An Unfinished Project” Jürgen Habermas, 
one of the most important modern thinkers in the Enlightenment tradition, concludes 
that the prospects for the fulfillment of the Enlightenment promise “are not very 
encouraging.” 2 
Few concerns about the project of modernity attract more attention than the 
continued survival of violence.  More than two centuries separate us from the time 
when Immanuel Kant reflected on the capacity of reason to create eternal peace, and 
they have seen violence on an industrial scale.  The great French revolution 
surrendered the ideals of liberty and inviolability of rights to the violence of the Terror 
and the Napoleonic wars.  The revolutions of the 19th and 20th century, colonialism 
2 Jürgen Habermas, “Modernity:  An Unfinished Project,” in Habermas and the Unfinished Project of Modernity 
(Cambridge, Mass: MIT Press, 1997), 38-55, pp. 54-55. 
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and nationalism also claimed their share of brutality and barbarity.   The massive 
slaughter of the two world wars in the 20th century with the extermination of six 
million Jews under the Nazis shocked even those who were not oblivious to man’s 
capacity for evil.  Even the triumphant moment of liberal democracy that followed the 
end of the Cold War and the collapse of Soviet Communism was marked by numerous 
outbursts of savagery and barbarism across Europe and the world. 
Such is the visible record of the period that has experienced an unprecedented 
growth of material wealth and technological power.  But there has also been insidious 
forms of violence that went unrecorded and unpublicized—violence that has been 
difficult to track or document:  the violence towards women, domestic violence, child 
abuse, lynching, gay bashing, and even more subtle and insidious forms of violence—
such as psychological, verbal, or symbolic—that ruined lives and careers, and left 
indelible scars on individual and collective psyche. 
One would certainly be in remiss to see the modern period exclusively in terms of 
violence and destruction.  In his well-publicized book The Better Angels of Our Nature:  
Why Violence Has Declined that has generated a great deal of controversy, Steven Pinker, 
a Harvard psychologist, has marshaled a great deal of empirical evidence to prove that 
despite all the wars and destruction, the current exposure to violence is significantly 
less severe that it was several hundred years ago, to say nothing about several 
millennia.3  Pinker has no illusions about the human race.  He sees humans as equally 
predisposed to both conflict and cooperation by the evolutionary hard wiring of our 
brain.  However, he also emphasizes what he sees as an encouraging influence of the 
“civilizing process”—the term he borrows from Norbert Elias.  In Pinker’s view the 
improved material circumstances of human existence and the ameliorating cultural 
attitudes have significantly diminished the level of violence in the modern world by 
comparison with the preceding periods.   
Pinker’s statistics and arguments are not universally accepted.  Some feel that 
statistics may be misleading in assessing the level of violence in the modern world.  
The declining percentages conceal much greater absolute numbers.  The statistical 
odds may mean little for those who still lose their life to violence today.  There is also 
no guarantee that the relatively peaceful period that we have experienced since World 
War II will not end in a new cataclysm.  Some of the aspects of the civilizing process 
cited positively by Pinker may appear to be a dubious blessing.  For example, the 
monopolization of violence by the state may diminish the level of violence among 
individuals, but it certainly preserves violence as a tool of the state vis-à-vis its citizens.  
The irony has not escaped Elizabeth Kolbert who in her review of Pinker’s book has 
3 Steven Pinker, The Better Angels of Our Nature: Why Violence Has Declined (New York: Viking, 2011). 
                                                          
 GENNADY SHKLIAREVSKY 303 
cited Churchill’s remark:  “It may well be that we shall by a process of sublime irony 
have reached a stage in this story where safety will be the sturdy child of terror, and 
survival the twin brother of annihilation.”4    
Dan Stone also observes that violence “need not involve the relation of individuals; 
the state is just as capable of treating the ‘object of violence’ as one ‘potentially worthy 
of bodily harm, or even annihilation’.”5  In his review of Pinker’s book in The Christian 
Science Monitor Jordan Smith argues: 
As a proportion of the world's population, or even just Norway's, the sixty-nine 
casualties on Utøya hardly register.  By Pinker's method of accounting, they 
received far too much coverage; in an average year in Norway, some three 
hundred people die from accidental poisoning. But the shootings illustrate in 
nightmare fashion what we all know to be the case.  Hate and madness and 
cruelty haven't disappeared, and they aren't going to.  Systems break down and, 
worse still, can be subverted.  This is one of the lessons of Auschwitz, and it's 
why, since 1945, most people have hesitated to argue that modernity and violence 
are opposed . . . The demons may yet return (Smith 2011).6 
This article does not intend to enter the fray over Pinker’s book.  Both Pinker and his 
critics agree that the level of violence in contemporary society still remains 
prohibitively high and that violence and the civilizing process have proven to be 
compatible if not agreeable companions.  The question is: Why do they coexist?  What 
makes their coexistence possible?  Will the civilizing process ever be able to get rid of 
violence and deliver on the promise of modernity? 
CRITIQUE OF THE MODERN CONCEPTION OF REASON 
The persistence of violence under modern conditions is an enigma that continues to 
baffle researchers.  Explanations of this persistence vary widely:  from the emphasis on 
biology and evolution, to social conditions, to culture and politics.7 Despite their 
4 Elizabeth Kolbert, “Peace in Our Time,” New Yorker 87, no. 30 (October 3, 2011): 75-78. 
5 Dan Stone, “Modernity and Violence:  theoretical reflections on the Einsatzgruppen,” Journal of Genocide 
Research, 1(3), 1999, 367-378, p. 374. 
6 Jordan Michael Smith, “The Better Angels of Our Nature: Why Violence Has Declined,” Christian 
Science Monitor (October 20, 2011). 
7 Here are some references to these different perspectives:  Martin Enserink, “Searching for the Mark of 
Cain,” Science 289, no. 5479 (July 28, 2000): 575-580; H. J. Eysenck, “The Origins of Violence,” Journal of 
Medical Ethics 5, no. 3 (1979): 105-107; Suzanne Maiello, “Broken links:  attacks or breakdown?  Notes on 
the origins of violence,” Journal of Child Psychotherapy, Vol. 26, No. 1 (2000), pp. 5-24; Christopher J. 
Ferguson and Kevin M. Beaver, “Natural born killers: The genetic origins of extreme violence,” Aggression 
and Violent Behavior 14, no. 5 (September): 286-294. Alexander Lee, “Who Becomes a Terrorist?: Poverty, 
Education, and the Origins of Political Violence,” World Politics 63, no. 2 (2011): 203-245; Arjun 
Appadurai, “Dead Certainty: Ethnic Violence in the Era of Globalization,” Development and Change 29, 
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differences, all these perspectives agree that in one way or another—by omission or by 
commission—reason is implicated in this continued survival of violence.  Critics of 
modernity, such as Hannah Arendt or Zygmunt Bauman, lay violence squarely at the 
doorstep of reason.  They see violence as instrumental to reason and view it as a direct 
outcome of the project of modernity—an inevitable consequence of its efforts to 
control and compartmentalize human life in the name of putative progress, 
technocratic efficiency, and governmental bureaucratic logic.8  As Gianni Vattimo 
summarized:  
The discovery that the rationalization of the world turns against reason and its 
ends of perfection and emancipation, and does so not by error, accident, or a 
chance distortion, but precisely to the extent that it is more and more perfectly 
accomplished.9 
Others try to vindicate reason and modernity from the alleged complicity in 
violence.  Dan Stone, for example, in his article “Modernity and violence:  theoretical 
reflections on the Einsatzgruppen”10 disputes the argument that violence is a logical 
consequence of modernization.  Although he recognizes the fact that violence and 
modern civilization can coexist and that violence can survive within modernity, he 
does not see them as intimately and logically connected.  In his nuanced reading of the 
reports by Einsatzgruppen, Stone tries to show “how the conjunction of rationalized 
society and violent passions--which exist now as they did before 1945—erupts at 
certain moments into so apocalyptic a force.”11  Stone sees Nazi violence as a product 
of the paradox in their project.  According to his interpretation, the Nazis attempted to 
destroy the foundation of modern society; but this attempt, in his view, “was derived 
no. 4 (October 1, 1998): 905-925; José Casanova, “Cosmopolitanism, the clash of civilizations and 
multiple modernities,” Current Sociology 59, no. 2 (2011): 252-267; Hannah Arendt, On Violence (New 
York: Harcourt, Brace & World, 1970); Jr. Barrington Moore, “Thoughts on Violence and Democracy,” 
Proceedings of the Academy of Political Science 29, no. 1 (January 1, 1968): 1-12; Georges Bataille, The 
Accursed Share: An Essay on General Economy (New York : London: Zone ; Distributed by MIT, n.d.); 
Peg Birmingham, “On Violence, Politics, and the Law,” The Journal of Speculative Philosophy 24, no. 1 
(2010): 1-20; Zygmunt Bauman, Modernity and the Holocaust (Ithaca, N.Y: Cornell University Press, 1989); 
René Girard, The Scapegoat (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986); Dan Stone, “Modernity 
and violence: theoretical reflections on the Einsatzgruppen,” Journal of Genocide Research 1, no. 3 (November 
1999): 367. 
8 Hannah Arendt, On Violence (New York:  Harcourt, Brace and World, 1970); Zygmunt Bauman, Modernity 
and the Holocaust (Ithaca:  Cornell University Press, 1989). 
9 Gianni Vattimo, The Transparent Society, cited in Dan Stone, “Modernity and violence,” p. 375. 
10 Special paramilitary death squads in Nazi Germany that were responsible for most of the mass killings 
of civilian population during World War II. 
11 Stone, p. 376. 
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from that society itself.” 12  It is this contradictory agenda of undermining modernity 
from within modernity that led to the eruption of violence.  As Stone summarizes: 
What the Einsatzgruppen reports demonstrate is the existence of violence within 
modernity, not violence that rejects modernity, but nevertheless a violence which, 
in its shabby brutality, cannot simply be seen as a logical consequence of 
modernization.13 
Contentions over persistence of violence show how intractable the problem is.  
Despite concerted efforts to contain it, violence remains ubiquitous.  It continues to 
reappear in places where we least expect it.  The ideals of the Enlightenment promised 
the world of peace, justice, and tolerance.  Yet they could not prevent and, as some 
argue, actually contributed to the terror of the French Revolution, colonialism, world 
wars, and the savagery of genocides.  In trying to understand wars, crimes, abuse, 
torture, we seek to assert the power of word and human reason and their supremacy 
over violence.  Yet reason and word appear to be impotent against violence.  Despite 
all efforts, violence remains immune to our words and deeds; it always manages to 
escape a capture.  It is, as David Bell and Lawrence Schehr put it, “an ineffable of our 
existence”—uncontainable, unrepresentable, and ultimately uncontrollable.14 
But why should this be so?  Why is violence capable of escaping capture?  Why 
reason is powerless against it?  Is it possible that reason itself contains violence?  This 
question is not new.  One encounters this idea, for example, in a curious inversion of 
the Malthusian loop by George Bataille, who has argued in his The Accursed Share (Le 
part maudite) that the economic rationality produces excess energy that needs to be 
destroyed.15  To Adorno and Horkheimer the Odyssey reveals “a terrible vengeance” 
and mutilation that the birth of reason wreaked on the primordial world of myth.16  
Although the answers provided by those who identified reason with violence may not 
be ultimately convincing, the possibility of reason’s complicity in violence that they 
raise certainly encourages one to explore the conception of reason that has been and 
continues to be dominant in Western culture.   
“Reason” and “rationality” are very familiar words.  We often use them without 
thinking much about the meaning that we attribute to them.  We tend to forget that 
the way we think about and use reason may not necessarily be universal:  it is a 
12 Stone, p. 375. 
13 Stone, p. 376. 
14 David F. Bell and Lawrence R. Schehr, “Reading Violence,” SubStance, No. 86, 1998, p. 3. 
15 Georges Bataille, The Accursed Share:  An Essay on General Economy, vol. 1 (New York : Zone ; London :  
MIT Press, 1988). 
16 Theodor W. Adorno and Max Horkheimer, “Odysseus or Myth and Enlightenment,” New German 
Critique, no. 56 (Spring 1992): 109-141, p. 140. 
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product of a particular time and place.  The way we think about reason has originated 
and evolved during the modern period in Western culture, and despite its numerous 
evolutionary permutations and peregrinations, still retains its original core.  When 
reading Voltaire, Rousseau, Kant, or Hegel, we still feel that despite many differences 
among them and between them and us, the way they and we think about reason is 
essentially the same.  We accept this view of reason as a self-evident truth—a sort of 
Kantian synthetic a priori judgment.  We consider it universal, that is, valid in all 
possible circumstances and under all empirical conditions.  We are so sure of our way 
of understanding reason that we have rarely, if ever, submitted it to critical 
examination.  We have never really asked ourselves a question if it is really true. 
So what is this way that we see reason and how does it shapes the way we use it?  
We can find the answer to this question by looking at some of the products of our use 
of reason.  Let’s take, for example, two philosophical perspectives that currently 
dominate the way we approach and interpret reality—realism and anti-realism.  
As John Searle defines it, 
Realism is the view that there is a way that things are that is logically 
independent of all human representations.  Realism does not say how things are 
but only that there is a way that they are.17 
According to Searle, the realist view of the world has the following structural 
features:18 
1.  World (or alternatively, reality or the universe) exists independently of our 
representations of it. 
2.  Human beings have a variety of interconnected ways of having access to and 
representing features of the world to themselves. 
3.  Some of these representations . . . purport to be about and to represent how 
things are in reality.  To the extent that they succeed of fail, they are said to be 
true or false, respectively.  They are true if and only if they correspond to the 
facts in reality. 
4.  Systems of representation . . . are human creations, and to that extent 
arbitrary. 
5.  Complete epistemic objectivity is difficult, sometimes impossible. 
6.  Having knowledge consists in having true representations for which we can 
give certain sorts of justification or evidence.  Knowledge is thus by definition 
17 John R Searle, The Construction of Social Reality (New York: Free Press, 1995), p. 155. 
18 Searle, The Construction of Social Reality, pp. 150-51.  For reasons of convenience and economy I provide a 
slightly abridged verbatim version. 
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objective in the epistemic sense, because the criteria for knowledge are not 
arbitrary, and they are impersonal. 
As one can see from the above, the ontological separation of the subject and the 
object is at the very core of the realist view of the world.  In accordance with this view, 
knowledge of reality is possible and involves an infinite asymptotic approximation 
between objects of reality and our representations of them. 
There are numerous philosophical perspectives that disagree with realism.  Despite 
their differences and even incompatibilities, they share some common features that 
allow to group them together under the general rubric of anti-realism.19  Broadly 
speaking, anti-realism is a philosophical critique of the main tenets of realism.  It is 
beyond the scope of this paper to go into a detailed examination of these 
disagreements.  It is quite sufficient to observe that they all boil down to one 
fundamental disagreement over the issue of validation.  In contrast to realists, anti-
realists maintain that we can never be sure how things actually are because a fit 
between a theory and data is insufficient for truth claims.  Paul Horwich, for example, 
offers the following generalization:  
It [anti-realism] derives from an impression of conflict between the alleged 
autonomy of the facts (their independence of us) and their accessibility (the 
possibility of our gaining knowledge of their existence). Consequently, it seems to 
the anti-realist that something of our naive point of view must be given up; some 
philosophical move must be made.20  
In support of their argument anti-realists refer to numerous theories in the past 
that fitted well with empirical data but have ultimately proven to be false (for example, 
the theory of flat Earth, the theory that placed Earth in the center of our planetary 
system, or the ether theory of light).  They also point to the phenomenon of 
underdetermination—that is, the existence of different and often conflicting theories 
that are supported by the same empirical evidence—as a proof that a fit is no 
guarantee of the validity of a theory.21 
19 For a good overview of both realism and its opponents, see Psillos, P. (1999) Scientific Realism: How Science 
Tracks Truth (London: Routledge); Ladyman, J. (2001) Understanding Philosophy of Science (London: 
Routledge); John R Searle, The Construction of Social Reality (New York: Free Press, 1995). 
20 Paul Horwich, “Realism and Truth,” Noûs 30 (January 1, 1996): 187-197, p. 188. 
21 On underdetermination see Carl Hoefer and Alexander Rosenberg, “Empirical equivalence, 
underdetermination, and systems of the world.,” Philosophy of Science 61, no. 4 (December 1994): 592; Jarrett 
Leplin, “The Underdetermination of Total Theories,” Erkenntnis (1975-) 47, no. 2 (January 1, 1997): 203-
215; Lars Bergström, “Underdetermination and Realism,” Erkenntnis (1975-) 21, no. 3 (November 1, 1984): 
349-365; Alberto Cordero, “Realism and Underdetermination: Some Clues from the Practices-Up,” 
Philosophy of Science 68, no. 3 (2001): S301-S312; Darrin Belousek, “Underdetermination, Realism, and 
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As one can see, there is a fundamental difference between realism and anti-
realism.  Anti-realism radically disagrees with the realist assertion that reality is 
knowable.  Yet despite this critical difference, both realists and anti-realists have the 
same core conception of reality and reason.  Both posit a gap between the subject and 
the object, except that the realists believe that this gap can be mediated by reason, 
while the anti-realists think that the credibility of such mediation is suspect.  The gap 
between the knower and reality that is present in both perspectives indicates that both 
accept the traditional dualism as a given. 
This dualism goes far back to the very early periods in the evolution of human 
thought.  Plato, for example, believed that mind and body were ontologically distinct.  
The division between thought and reality, mind and matter, body and soul, subject 
and object, and the knower and the known is characteristic for much of the European, 
and not only European, intellectual tradition.22  This ontological dualism powerfully 
shapes the way we conceptualize reason and the way it operates.  However, is the 
positing of this gap justified?  Is it supported by empirical evidence? 
ONE-SIDED CONSCIOUSNESS AND ITS PREDISPOSITION TOWARDS VIOLENCE 
In order to answer these questions, I will turn to the work of Swiss psychologist Jean 
Piaget on the origin of intelligence.  In his remarkable study The Origin of Intelligence in 
Children and in his other studies Piaget provides a very detailed empirical account of 
the development of symbolic thought.23  The starting point in his account of this 
development is reflexes, or physiological functions (for example, muscle contraction).  
These functions require neural circuits for coordination and regulation.  Nerve signals 
recursively trigger these functions and thus conserve them.  The more often this 
triggering takes place, the more often physiological functions are exercised, and the 
more stable they are.   Stable recursively operating reflex functions form what Piaget 
calls circular schemata, or sensory-motor operations.  
Sensory-motor operations conserve themselves in two ways.  First, they become 
increasingly oriented toward external reality in search of stimulation.  This process 
evolves from random groping to a more directed search for stimuli that leads to a 
gradual construction of the object on the level of sensory-motor operations (but not yet 
on the representational level).  As the growing number of objects is incorporated into 
Theory Appraisal: An Epistemological Reflection on Quantum Mechanics.,” Foundations of Physics 35, no. 4 
(April 2005): 669-695. 
22 In philosophy of science, dualism often refers to the dichotomy between the "subject" (the observer) and 
the "object" (the observed).  Criticism of Western science may label this kind of dualism as a flaw in the 
nature of science itself.  On dualism see Robinson 2011; Dickens 2010. 
23 Jean Piaget, The Origin of Intelligence in Children (Madison:  International Universities Press, Inc., 1998). 
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sensory-motor schemata—the process Piaget calls assimilation—the infant becomes 
increasingly orientated toward the exogenous sphere. 
Second, sensory-motor operations conserve themselves through coordination with 
each other and mutual assimilation (for example, tactile, audio, visual, gustatory, and 
other functions).  One example of such mutual assimilation is the activation of the 
audio function by the visual one, and vice versa.  In other words, infants begin to “see” 
when they hear and “hear” when they see (for example, at a certain age infants begin 
to turn their head to catch the sight of the mother when they hear her voice).  Mutual 
assimilations on the sensory-motor level require coordination and mutual assimilation 
on the level of neural networks.  The increasing interaction on the neural level creates 
the permanent neural organization that combines neural networks and eventually 
leads to the construction of permanent mental representations, or images.  This 
process is completed at the beginning of the second year when infants begin to look for 
objects that are hidden from a direct view.  The search for a hidden object indicates 
that an infant has already constructed a permanent mental image of the object; in 
other words, for infants the object begins to exist even when they do not see it.  Mental 
representations regulate the functioning of combinations of neural networks (that in 
turn regulate sensory-motor operations) and act recursively on them.  
The above explanation shows that one and the same process constructs, on one 
hand, objects of reality as they appear to us and, on the other, organizes our mind.  In 
other words, it is this process of construction that constitutes true ontological reality, 
not the subject or the object that are merely its products.  This process plays a vital 
role in the development of our mind and in the construction of our consciousness, or 
what we call reason.  It is the source of reason.  Our representations of reality will 
change; our consciousness will change.  But the process of construction will remain the 
same in all of its essential features.  Yet despite the importance of the process of 
construction for understanding human reason and how it operates, we exclude the 
process of construction from our view of reality and represent its products—the subject 
and the object—as the true ontological reality.  Despite the absolute primacy of the 
process of construction, the conception of reality prevalent in modern culture focuses 
either on the subject (anti-realists) or on the object (realists) that are merely its 
products.  Thus our conception of reality is fundamentally flawed. 
It is hard to overestimate the role of mind and consciousness in our individual lives 
and our civilization as a whole.  Operations performed in our consciousness powerfully 
affect the way we interpret reality, which, in turn, shapes our actions.  Therefore, the 
exclusion of the process of construction from our view of reality and our conception of 
reason also has a powerful effect on how we interpret reality and, consequently, how 
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we act.  The exclusive focus on the products of construction creates a framework for 
interpreting reality that leaves out the most important part of reality.  It should, 
therefore, come as no surprise then that when we use this deficient framework, we get 
a very distorted view of reality.  When we apply this framework to interpreting reality, 
we squeeze reality into the Procrustean bed of our extremely limited vision and thus 
commit an act of violence. 
Our interactions with reality involve two principal operations:  assimilation and 
adaptation.  Assimilation is an operation that integrates objects of reality into internal 
functional schemata of the organism.  This operation reduces the multiple and diverse 
world to the internal functions of our organism.  Assimilation deprives objects of their 
autonomy and subordinates them to the functions of the organism.  It is a very violent 
operation that is best exemplified by the devouring of one organism by another.  
By contrast, adaptation involves recognition of the autonomy of reality and its 
objects.  It essentially adjusts the functions of the organism to these autonomous 
objects.  For example, due to adaptation, the child begins to modify the mode of 
prehension depending on the object’s shape and texture.  Due to adaptation, the 
organism can establish a more balanced relationship with reality.  It creates a 
possibility for knowing reality as it is rather than reducing it to the functions of the 
organism.  As an operation, adaptation plays an exceptional role in the origin and 
evolution of human intelligence and knowledge.24  
In his studies of intelligence Piaget shows that both operations are closely 
interrelated and play a very important role in the origin and evolution of human 
consciousness and symbolic thought.  When we use a deficient framework for 
interpreting reality, when we reduce reality to our mental functions, we essentially 
limit ourselves to performing only one operation—assimilation.  Unrestrained by 
adaptation, assimilation severely limits our capacity for understanding the multiple 
and diverse world; it does not recognize the autonomy of this reality; it subordinates 
reality to our own internally generated schemes.  The result is a one-sided and self-
centered representation of reality 
Human reason (consciousness) regulates our interactions with reality.  When our 
consciousness excludes the process of construction from its field of vision, it creates an 
inadequate and flawed interpretation of reality.   This violence is not exclusively 
symbolic—that is, producing merely an inadequate knowledge of reality.  It has real 
physical effects. 
As a product of the evolution, our consciousness has much in common with the 
rest of nature.  One of the most fundamental processes that operate in our 
24 Piaget, Behavior and Evolution (New York:  Pantheon Books, 1978). 
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consciousness, as it does in the rest of nature, is conservation.  When our consciousness 
excludes the process of construction from its field of vision, it excludes the most 
important part of reality.  With the process of construction out of the frame, our 
consciousness can only focus on the disconnected products of this process—the subject 
or the object—rather than the process itself.  As a result, it tends to conserve the 
products rather than the process; it fetishizes and absolutizes those products and 
regards them as the only true reality, thus disrupting the process of construction and 
limiting its creative capacity.  As the process of construction evolves and the old 
products are subjected to the pressure of change, a one-sided consciousness 
experiences this process of change as a loss of reality. 
There are few traumatic experiences that can compare to loss of reality, that is, 
situations when people get a feeling that they can no longer understand reality or 
interpret it correctly.  For a consciousness that experience such situation, reality 
becomes a void, an abyss devoid of any meaning, or worse, filled with negative 
meaning.  In words of Shakespeare, time gets “out of joint.”  Such consciousness 
develops a sense of disorientation, confusion, and fear; and violence is a very common 
corollary of fear.  To make things worse, the capacity of such severely limited 
consciousness to cope with this condition is reduced to only one cognitive operation—
assimilation.  Such consciousness is incapable of critically examining itself; it simply 
cannot see the internal sources of its predicament.  Rather than address the real source 
of its fear within itself, this consciousness tends to look for the cause of the fear outside 
itself:  it develops the need to construct the enemy, to create a scapegoat on whom it 
can project its fears.25  Since fear causes violent reactions, the enemy becomes the 
object of this violence and the destruction of the enemy becomes an obsessive but also 
elusive goal—elusive because the true cause of fear is never addressed.   
Freud clearly understood the internal mechanism of the need to construct the 
enemy when he made a perceptive remark in reference to the Bolshevik revolution:  
“When Bolsheviks destroy all the capitalists, what are they going to do?”  No 
destruction could possibly assuage the Bolshevik or Nazi anxiety, their fear, and 
consequently their need to construct and pursue the imaginary “enemy.”  No matter 
how many victims they sacrificed to their “jealous god,” it continued to demand more 
sacrifices. 
Despite numerous failures and much criticism, there are no signs that we will 
abandon the project of modernity any time soon.  Its fundamental message retains a 
powerful appeal for many of us.  As useful as it may be, criticism does not offer 
25 For an interesting discussion of the phenomenon of demonization and scapegoating see Ducharme and 
Fine 1995. 
                                                          
 COSMOS AND HISTORY 312 
alternatives.  And there are no alternatives for humans other than relying on reason—
our most powerful tool in dealing with reality.  What other means do we have?  What 
else is powerful enough to give us a hope for a better future?  Our consciousness has an 
infinite combinatorial capacity for constructing new operations.  It is by far the most 
powerful form of organization of matter.   There is nothing in the universe that can 
even come close to its power.  Yet, an indisputable fact remains that so far our reason 
has not been able to cope with violence.  Despite all our efforts violence continues to 
survive.  It hides in numerous interstices of our complex society and rears its ugly head 
at any opportunity. 
CONCLUSION 
As this paper has argued, the continued survival of violence is not a proof that its 
power is superior to that of reason.  Violence is associated with only one operation in 
the arsenal of tools available to us for dealing with reality.  As important as 
assimilation is for the functioning of the organism, its power cannot even come close in 
comparison to the infinitely more powerful combination of assimilation and 
adaptation. 
This paper has also argued that the remarkable survival of violence is due 
primarily to the fact that reason has allowed violence to subsist on the powers of 
reason.   Unwittingly and unintentionally we limited the power of our consciousness by 
excluding the process of construction from its frame of vision and thus profoundly 
disturbing the required delicate balance between assimilation and adaptation.  Thus 
reason yields to violence by failing to embrace its true reality and the source of its 
enormous power—the process of construction.  This process lies at the very core of 
reality and its evolution.  Our consciousness inherited it in the course of the biological 
evolution.  It is a product of this process.  It uses this process to create new forms of 
organization of reality and propel the evolution.  The power of our consciousness in 
creating new forms is infinite.  There is nothing that can prevent it from constructing 
yet another level of organization.26  Only when our consciousness fails to embrace its 
true reality, the power of reason turns into a source of its powerlessness.  Its 
remarkable capacity to create reality turns into destructive violence against reality.  
Indeed, “the sleep of reason produces monsters.”27 
In order to cope with violence, reason has to renew itself.  Our consciousness has 
to embrace the source of its power—the process of construction.  If we consciously 
26 See Gennady Shkliarevsky, “The Paradox of Observing, Autopoiesis, and the Future of Social 
Sciences,” vol. 24, issue 3 (May/June 2007), pp. 323-332. 
27 The phrase is borrowed from the title of one of Francisco Goya’s series of etchings Los Caprichos. 
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embrace and understand the process of construction and its fundamental relation to 
our consciousness, we will no longer have to experience uncontrollable fear of losing 
reality.  The confusion and disorientation that accompanies the emergence of new 
levels of organization of reality will lose much of its traumatic impact if we understand 
that we are not losing reality in these moments of transition; rather, they bring us into 
a very close and intimate contact with the process that is the source of our existence—
our true reality.  We will no longer have to experience fear during such transitions.  If 
we understand the inner source of our discomfort and are capable of using our critical 
powers for controlling it, we will no longer have a need to resort to violence against 
imaginary external “enemy” as a way of dealing with our fears; we will no longer have 
to engage in a ceaseless and totally futile effort of coping with this fear.  Violence will 
no longer run amok in its senseless destruction. 
This is not to argue for an idealistic and utopian vision.  Violence is a natural 
phenomenon.  It is a product of an operation that is very important for the evolution 
of reality.  Without assimilation reality would never be able to evolve.  As important as 
adaptation is, it cannot sustain the evolution by itself.  Adaptation has to work in close 
interrelationship and balance with assimilation.  However, the importance of 
assimilation does not imply that violence cannot be contained.  Adaptation is capable 
of ameliorating the detrimental aspects of assimilation.  Working together and in 
balance assimilation and adaptation are capable of providing constructive channels 
and productive outlets for our creative energies in our pursuit of new and ever more 
powerful levels of organization of reality. 
We live in an age of disbelief and skepticism, if not cynicism.  Some critics may be 
tempted to see in this essay only an inflated ego and megalomaniac illusions.  
Skepticism is a safe game in our age.  It does not really have to provide solutions.  Yet 
when skillfully performed, the work of a skeptic may place him or her into a hallowed 
position of truth-maker when in fact no truth is being made. 
This essay does not appeal to faith.  On the contrary, it calls for serious 
engagement and intense introspection.  Only an inveterate idealist can believe that one 
can easily get rid of political practices, institutions, and social habits that promote and 
foster violence.  Certainly, the elimination of violence will require concerted, 
consistent, and well-coordinated efforts by many dedicated individuals—activists, 
professionals, political and religious leaders, and public figures.  A theoretical insight is 
only a step to a solution.  Rather than seeking to recruit followers in a faith effort, this 
paper tries to encourage a liberating critical re-examination of our most fundamental, 
most dearly held beliefs about reality in the name and in fulfillment of the promise 
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made several centuries ago at the dawn of the modern age—the promise of the 
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